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Article
Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade
Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (2006)
Kevin J. Fandlt
This Article brings to the attention of those public servants involved in
the design and negotiation of free trade agreements between the United
States and developing countries, such as Colombia, the potential benefits
and drawbacks of negotiating in a bilateral forum. Rather than critiquing
the free trade agreement for its particular provisions, this Article
examines the U.S. policy of negotiating bilaterally with developing
countries as opposed to multilaterally in the world trade system and what
effects such an approach might have on the economic development of the
latter. Using an incremental policy analysis, the Article critiques the
bilateral approach in terms of economic development and fair trade
negotiations using the recent Colombia-U.S. trade agreement as a case
study. The Article concludes that a bilateral approach that is disconnected
from a broader multilateral context may be detrimental to developing
countries and recommends increased oversight of such agreements by the
World Trade Organization to ensure a higher degree offairness.
t Admitted to practice law in New York, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C.; B.A. Lock
Haven University of Pennsylvania; M.A., American University School of International Service,
J.D.; American University Washington College of Law; Ph.D. candidate, George Mason
University. Fulbright Fellow (Colombia). I would like to thank my wife, Monica Bibiana Lugo,
for her unwavering dedication and support of my quest toward a world that recognizes that
justice only begins where poverty ends. This article is dedicated to her and to the most
wonderful gift imaginable, our daughter, Isabella Sophia. I would also like to express my
deep gratitude to the editors at the Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, who worked
tirelessly and professionally to make this article respectable.
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INTRODUCTION:
SIDESTEPPING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES
Colombia is the most politically and economically northern-facing
country in South America today. Its ties with the United States go beyond
the drug war often associated with its landscape.' In fact, Colombia serves
as the South American keystone in terms of regional security2 and
stability3, as well as in terms of bilateral trade with the United States. As
the longest-standing democracy in all of Latin America 4 and as a major
trading partner with the United States,5 the interests of the two countries
are in many ways aligned. 6 With the five-year Plan Colombia program
7
coming to an end and yielding less than desirable results, and the increase
of left-leaning politicians in other parts of Latin America, the United States
has a strong incentive to strengthen ties with its southern partner.
Accordingly, following the unsuccessful negotiation of a regional
integration trade agreement between the Americas, negotiations began for
the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement between the two countries.
8
Following two years of intense talks and attempts to secure a workable
agreement, Colombia and the United States signed a bilateral trade
agreement on February 27, 2006.9 This was a momentous occasion for both
countries as Colombia, the third-largest Latin American economy, was on
the verge of losing its trade preferences under the Andean Trade
Preference Act (ATPA), and the United States, which sees Colombia as an
important player in its foreign policy, was losing ground in securing a
regional trade agreement via the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The agreement solidifies many of the trading practices that were in place
since 1991 under the ATPA, which was set to expire in December of 2006.10
1. See, e.g., Michael Beaulieu, US-Colombia Relations at a Crossroads, VIEWPOINTS AMERICAS,
Sept. 6, 2006, at 1, http://www.counciloftheamericas.org/coa/publications/ViewPoint
Americas/2006/USColombiaRelations-Beaulieu.pdf.
2. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Colombia, United States Allies in Fighting Terrorism,
Mar. 23, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Mar/27-412929.html.
3. See, e.g., DANIEL W. CHRISTMAN & JOHN G. HEIMANN, ANDES 2020: A NEW STRATEGY FOR
CHALLENGES OF COLOMBIA AND THE REGION 8-9 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Russell Crandall, The End of Civil Conflict in Colombia: The Military,
Paramilitaries, and a New Role for the United States, 19 SAIS REV. 223, 223 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Colombia
Conclude Free Trade Agreement, (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
PressReleases/2006/ February/ UnitedStates ColombiaConcludeFreeTradeAgreement.
html (highlighting the $14.3 billion in trade between the two countries).
6. See, e.g., Simon Romero, Bush Heads to Colombia as Scandal Taints Key Alliance, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A4 (describing Colombia as the closest U.S. ally in South America).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Institute of Peace, Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the
Strengthening of the State, (2000), http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan-
colombia_101999.html.
8. See Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2003, at 23.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Trade Representative, Conclude Free Trade Agreement, supra note 5.
10. Press Release, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia, USTR Expresses Strong Support for
Extending ATPA Preferences (Nov. 14, 2006), http://bogota.usembassy.gov/wwwsustratpae.
2007]
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In part, the choice to pursue a bilateral agreement represents a failure
on the part of the Bush Administration to secure the FTAA, which had
been under negotiation since 1998.11 Instead, the United States chose to
negotiate bilateral agreements with the four Andean countries: Colombia,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Recent political events in Bolivia 12 and
Ecuador13 indicate the unlikelihood of securing agreements with those
countries.
Although the agreement with Colombia has not yet been formalized
into law, as it must first be ratified by the U.S. Congress, its supporters
offer unquestioning approval of the final terms, and thus, it is likely to be
ratified soon. For example, former U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Portman said of the deal, "[t]he agreement will help foster economic
development in Colombia and contribute to efforts to counter narco-
terrorism, which threatens democracy and regional stability."'
4
Economists, industry leaders, and politicians on both sides of the
agreement have expressed their support for this arrangement.
5
The agreement is beneficial for U.S. businesses that work with Latin
America or that intend to in the future.1 6 But is this the best arrangement
for Colombia? Will this agreement bring economic growth to the
Colombian economy, and will that growth reach the impoverished
majority? Would Colombia benefit more from pushing for unification of
the Andean Community with Mercosur, uniting two powerful trade blocs
and fostering a comprehensive regional trading bloc on par with the
European Union and NAFTA?
This paper will explore the use of bilateral trade agreements as a
general public policy, seen through the eyes of both the dominant and the
subordinate parties to the agreement. It will then explore the Colombian
market and its distinctions from a traditional market that may play a role
in the establishment and successful operation of a free trade agreement.
Subsequently, using an incrementalist policy analysis, the U.S.-Colombia
Free Trade Agreement will be explored in context by highlighting the
potential benefits and drawbacks of the arrangement to Colombia. Finally,
I will draw conclusions and make recommendations in an effort to guide
shtml.
11. See Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the Future
of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1030 (2004).
12. Bush Signs ATPDEA Extension into Law, LATINNEWS DAILY, Dec. 21, 2006 (discussing
the unwillingness of Bolivia's new president, Evo Morales, to negotiate a trade agreement
with the United States).
13. New Ecuador Leader Nixes U.S. Trade Pact, AFX INTERNATIONAL Focus, Dec. 10, 2006
(indicating that Rafael Correa, the incoming Ecuadorian president, will not sign a trade
agreement with the United States).
14. U.S., Colombia Reach Free Trade Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2006.
15. See, e.g., Kathryn McConnell, United States Signs Free-Trade Agreement with Colombia,
USINFO, Nov. 22, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2006&m=November&x = 20061122121011AKllennoCcM.6516535.
16. Carranza, supra note 11, at 1032 (suggesting that the FTAA will give the U.S.
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policymakers on the negotiation of other such arrangements in the future,
including a proposed merger between the Andean Community and
Mercosur.
I. THE USE OF BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS TO PROMOTE FREE TRADE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Trade policy is one of the key components of any effective foreign
policy. The establishment of beneficial trade relationships can facilitate
domestic growth and industry expansion, while simultaneously promoting
the development of an efficient global marketplace. Bilateral free trade
agreements offer each country a set of particularized benefits that will, in
theory, increase its position as an exporter to the other party, among other
things. These benefits generally include reduced tariffs and quotas on key
products exported to the other country, which allow exporters to reduce
overall costs.
The United States has the largest economy in the world, in terms of
gross domestic product (GDP).17 Accordingly, it has the greatest economic
influence and impact on other countries when negotiating trade
agreements. The strong voices of the U.S. business community and
industries such as agriculture and sugar have a substantial impact on the
positions taken by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR),18 the
key negotiating body for the United States.
The USTR has marketed free trade as a cure for the severe problems of
poverty in many developing countries in which it is negotiating
agreements.19 The logic behind this idea comes from the widely-held belief
that economic growth spurs poverty reduction and that free trade
agreements bring economic growth.20 However, several prominent scholars
have concluded quite the opposite, and support for this direct relationship
has weakened. Free trade may bring growth to certain sectors, but in the
majority of cases, the developing country experiences a reduction in
economic growth and an expansion of poverty. 2
1
17. But see David M. Lampton, The Faces of Chinese Power, FOR. AFF. Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 115,
115-16 (arguing that the United States has historically underestimated the growing economic
and political power of China).
18. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Drug Lobby Got a Victory in Trade Pact Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2005, at C1 (discussing the successful lobbying efforts of U.S. drug companies during the
negotiations for the Central American Free Trade Agreement); see also Chantal Thomas,
Challenges For Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12
(2004) (describing the strong influence of industries in lobbying for benefits under U.S. trade
policy).
19. See United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts at 5 (2003)
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ Document-Library/ Fact -Sheets/ 2003/ asset-upload-file962-
3466.pdf (contending that free trade is "among the most powerful tools available to fht
poverty").
20. M. Ayhan Kose, et al., How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and
Evidence, 24-25 (IMF Working Paper No. 04/59, 2004); see also Dani Rodrik, Growth Versus
Poverty Reduction: A Hollow Debate, 37 FIN. & DEV. 8, 8-9 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Kose, et al., supra note 20, at 25; U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., The Least
2007]
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The exceedingly slow process of multilateral trade negotiations,
namely that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), encourages
developed countries such as the United States to meet their demand for
better terms of trade through the use of smaller, less complicated bilateral
and regional trade agreements. These agreements promise short-term gains
in both trade access and political capital.
Powerful negotiators such as the United States have a vested interest in
seeing economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries
because this creates more secure investment environments and increases
the productivity of the world economy. However, if the policy of
negotiating bilateral trade agreements to achieve better terms of trade is
not adequately reducing poverty nor sustaining economic growth in
developing countries, it may be more appropriate to re-evaluate the policy
and attempt to identify more effective mechanisms for achieving these
goals. Thus, the next step in determining the effectiveness of bilateral trade
agreements as a public policy is to consider their impact on a developing
economy. Herein, this analysis will focus on the trade dynamics between
Latin America and the United States, focusing on Colombia as the case
study. Accordingly, we begin with an examination of the development of
trade between Latin America and the United States.
II. TRADE POLICY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
To fully appreciate the relationship between the United States and
Colombia, it is essential to understand the progression of trade
development within the Americas. Due to its close proximity, the United
States has long held a substantial interest in the economic and political
policies of Latin America. Yet this relationship has not always been strong,
nor has it always worked to the benefit of the parties. For Latin America,
the United States offers a substantial export market, lower shipping costs
than those to Europe or Asia, and a population receptive to its goods and
services. However, recent shifts in economic development away from
hemispheric integration, as well as shifts in political development away
from U.S. alignment, have weakened U.S. influence in the region and made
the conclusion of trade agreements more difficult. This section attempts to
briefly trace this progression and position Colombia in its relational context
with the United States, both historically and in today's global marketplace.
A. The Development of Latin American Trade Liberalization
Latin American trade policies throughout the 1970s relied largely upon
Developed Countries Report 2004:Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction, at 67, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/LCD/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.27 (2004), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2004-en.pdf (arguing that the assumption of an
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import substitution and infant industry protection, which involved
significant state assistance for new industries and the promotion of
industries that do not necessarily have a comparative advantage in trade.
22
The theory behind import substitution is that by limiting foreign imports of
manufactured goods and replacing them with domestically produced
goods, exports will begin to exceed imports and economic growth will
occur.23
The theory of comparative advantage urges countries to emphasize
production in sectors in which they have a productivity advantage over
other countries. Many countries in Latin America adhered to this theory at
the expense of focusing on other, faster-growing commodity exports in
which they did not possess these same advantages.24 Resulting growth in
the region during the 1970s tentatively confirmed the wisdom of these
policies; however, growth fell to nearly zero in the 1980s while Asian
countries, which relied on a theory of export promotion rather than import
substitution, grew rapidly. 25 During this period, per capita income in Latin
America declined by ten percent.26
Some researchers argue that the reason for the Latin American
economic stagnation during the 1980s was the failed policy of import
substitution, which was applied to different degrees in many countries in
the region.27 Joseph Stiglitz argues that this is not likely the case because,
despite different trade policies in each country, economic stagnation
occurred across the region.28 Rather, Stiglitz suggests that it was the
openness of the Latin American economy to Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and reliance on foreign capital goods that led to an increased debt
burden and a resulting economic shock.29 Growth among the Asian Tigers,
argues Stiglitz, resulted not simply from trade liberalization, but from the
simultaneous government intervention in trade, FDI, and other crucial
sectors of their growing economies. 30 The protectionist policies of East Asia
along with their export promotion were part of the reason that the region
grew so rapidly.31 This dependence on foreign capital combined with
domestic markets that were unprotected from foreign imports resulted in
22. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How CAN
TRADE PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 17-21 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Werner Baer, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America:
Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 1, 95-96 (1972).
24. See STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 19.
25. Id. at 19-20.
26. Peter Hakim, Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Why Latin America Should Be Interested?,
526 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 121, 123 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Guillermo Rozenwurcel, Why Have All the Development Strategies Failed in Latin
America?, 5 (UN U., World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Res., Research Paper No. 2006/12, 2006),
http://www.widner.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2006/rp2006-12.pdf (contending that
import substitution resulted in closed economies that prevented sufficient foreign
investment).
28. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 21-22.
29. Id.
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stagnant, if not negative growth in Latin America.
B. Colombia's Role in Hemispheric Trade
In 1991, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay joined to form the
regional trade association Mercosur.32 As the third largest trading bloc in
the world,33 with 235 million people and $2.05 trillion in GDP, Mercosur is
a powerful force in shaping relations between Latin America and the rest
of the world. Despite recent criticism of the regional agreement,34 Mercosur
has been growing in strength in recent years.35 It has been negotiating a
cooperation agreement with the European Community since 1995, with a
renewed push for this cooperation made in 2004.36 In addition, with the
granting of full membership to Venezuela in July 2006, Mercosur has been
likened to the European Union, but four times larger geographically. 37
Colombia had maintained an import substitution policy since the late
1950s. Only in 1991 did Colombia begin to reduce its trade barriers and
engage in regional trade agreements. 3 These agreements had been
developing throughout South America since around 1980, when countries
began to abandon trade protectionist policies and open their economies. 39
In 1969, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia formed the Andean
Community, which in 2005 had a population of roughly 118 million people
and a GDP of $650 billion.40 Colombia is also currently an associate
member of Mercosur, meaning that it is permitted to partake in free trade
agreements with Mercosur, but remains outside of the common market.41
Achieving Mercosur's goal of complete South American integration into
the common market would be highly beneficial for Colombia because the
32. See Treaty of Asunci6n, Dec. 31, 1994, 30 I.L.M. 1041.
33. See Diego Agudelo et al., Regional and Global Integration in South America: A Spanish
Fiesta Within Trade Communities, 7 Indiana Univ. Center for International Business Education
& Research (July 2005), http://www.kelley.indiana.edu/CIBER/research.cfm.
34. See, e.g., Downhill from Here: Mercosur's Summit, ECONOMIST July 29, 2006, at 36
(discussing the tensions created by the inclusion of Venezuela in the group).
35. See, e.g., European Trade: Take Your Partners, ECONOMIST Oct. 7, 2006, at 38 (suggesting
that the European Union is courting growing markets, including Mercosur).
36. See, e.g., European Commission External Relations, The E.U.'s Relations with
Mercosur, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external-relations/mercosur/intro/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2007). However, note that these talks are currently stalled due to discussions
over agricultural quotas, among other crucial trade issues. See, e.g., EU-Mercosur Trade Talks
Stalled, BBC NEWS, July 21, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3914787.stm.
37. Profile: Mercosur-Common Market of the South, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2006,
http:/ / news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/americas/ 5195834.stm [hereinafter Mercosur- Common Market of
the South].
38. Agudelo et al., supra note 33, at 7.
39. Id. at 2, 4.
40. Id. at 7. Note that Venezuela has recently announced its intention to withdraw from
the association. See, e.g., Venezuela's Withdrawal from CAN Prompts Worries, LATINNEWS DAILY,
April 21, 2006, at 1. But see Chavez Says Venezuela Willing to Reconsider Exit From CAN, BBC
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, April 24, 2006 (calling into question Venezuela's
commitment to withdraw from the Andean Community).
41. Mercosur- Common Market of the South, supra note 37.
[Vol. 10
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country would gain the stability-enhancing features of a common market.
This would allow for unified external tariffs, increased access to the diverse
Brazilian and Argentinean economies, and a much stronger voice in future
bilateral agreements, which would be negotiated between Mercosur and
the third country, rather than Colombia alone. While not a solution that
surpasses the benefits of solely multilateral negotiations, unification of
Colombia and the remaining Andean Community countries with Mercosur
as full members could potentially change the negotiating power of every
member state in all likely bilateral agreement negotiations in the future.
C. Attempted Unification of the Americas: The FTAA and Its Demise
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was first negotiated in
1998 at the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile. The intent of
the agreement initially was to expand the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) throughout the Western Hemisphere by making a
broader free trade zone.42 This zone would encompass approximately 800
million people.43 However, the Washington Consensus44 - a term used to
describe the export of free trade policies and liberal reform from the United
States -was now broadly opposed throughout Latin America, making the
negotiation of a regional trade agreement challenging. 45 According to Dr.
Mario Carranza, "[m]ost people in the region feel that two decades of
neoliberal economic policies have done little to alleviate poverty in Latin
America." 46 The policies purveyed by the Washington Consensus during
this period assumed that all barriers to trade were negative for economic
development and thus urged the rapid elimination of such barriers.47 The
trade shocks that would result were presumed to be temporary, and long-
term aggregate gains were hardly in doubt. However, as economic
recession set in during this period, Latin America found itself desperate for
loans to sustain the short-term losses that the Consensus brought. This led
to further barrier reduction in the region: "many developing nations
opened their markets to developed-world goods, not in a reciprocal deal at
the GATT, but as a condition of receiving IMF or World Bank funding."
48
The implementation of an FTAA in Latin America would allow the
42. See Carranza, supra note 11, at 1030.
43. See Agudelo et al., supra note 33, at 9.
44. This term, originally coined by John Williamson, is also called neoliberalism and often
refers to the process of globalization. See Washington Consensus, Center for International
Development at Harvard University, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/
washington.html (last updated Apr. 2003).
45. See Carranza, supra note 11, at 1047-48 (discussing the backlash resulting from the
implementation of the Washington Consensus throughout the 1990s).
46. Id. at 1049.
47. See Dani Rodrik, Rethinking Growth Policies in the Developing World, 1-2 (Oct. 8,
2004), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik/Luca-dAglianoLecture Oct_
2004.pdf (unpublished paper).
48. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND
ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 164 (2006).
20071
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United States in effect to consolidate "its political and economic relevance
in the world system."49 However, the FTAA negotiators from the United
States had to proceed cautiously, working to counteract this negative
image of U.S. influence in the region and to show their desire to foster a
new way forward. Because of the economic and political power of
Mercosur, issues of concern to the group must be addressed in any
multilateral trade talk. Two primary issues were raised by Brazil at the
FTAA talks: the Singapore issues and U.S. agricultural subsidies. The
"Singapore issues,"50 named for their negotiation at the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Singapore ministerial meeting in 1998, comprise a
group of four areas of concern to developed countries but of little value
and potential detrimental effect to developing countries. These issues are
investment, competition, transparency, and government procurement. The
proposed rules on foreign investment and competition policy could
potentially prevent developing countries from importing technology and
may give U.S. and European multinational businesses substantially more
status in developing countries than a domestic business. 51 The lack of
resolution surrounding this set of issues largely led to the breakdown of
the 2003 Cancun meeting of the WTO.
52
The more substantial sticking point for continued trade negotiations
involves the demand for the United States to eliminate its agricultural
subsidies, which provide roughly $20 billion in direct assistance 53 to a
farming sector comprising roughly 1% of the U.S. economy.54 Brazil
demanded that the United States reduce agricultural subsidies as a
condition of the FTAA, and the United States refused, stating instead that it
would negotiate these subsidies as part of the Doha round of world trade
negotiations.55 The failure of the parties to reach agreement on these two
issues led, in large part, to the breakdown of the negotiations.
56
The WTO Doha ministerial meeting was held in November 2001 and
set an aggressive agenda focused on development issues as they relate to
trade.57 This meeting established working groups and an agenda for all
member states to address at future ministerial meetings, which are held at
49. See Agudelo et al., supra note 33, at 10.
50. See, e.g., The Singapore Issues: Investment, Competition Policy, Transparency in
Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, 1 DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES 6 (Feb.
2003).
51. See Carranza, supra note 11, at 1051-52.
52. See World Trade Talks Collapse, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/3108460.stm.
53. See, e.g., Chris Edwards & Tad DeHaven, The Stubborn Seeds of U.S. Farm Subsidies,
CATO INST., Aug. 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/research/articles/ce082301.html.
54. See, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED STATES 5 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Carranza, supra note 11, at 1051.
56. See id. at 1052-53.
57. The Doha round was the fourth official high-level ministerial meeting since the 1995
establishment of the World Trade Organization. The most recent ministerial meeting was held
in Hong Kong in 2005. Meetings are mandated to be held every two years. Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. W, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
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least every two years. The United States intended to address subsidies in
the context of this agenda rather than in a regional trade negotiation
because they sought equivalent subsidy reductions from the European
Union,58 which would only happen in the context of multilateral trade
negotiations. However, there was industry support for addressing the
subsidies issue, as part of the FTAA negotiations, and economic surveys
appeared to show an overall beneficial result to U.S. agriculture upon the
elimination of subsidies in the FTAA region.59
There was strong support for the FTAA in many parts of Latin
America, including those countries that objected to certain provisions
regarding subsides and the Singapore issues. For instance, the Brazilian
Ambassador to the United States, Rubens A. Barbosa, released a statement
calling for the restart of the FTAA negotiations. He said:
The ultimate goal of the process is not free trade for its own sake,
but rather achieving the technological, economic, social,
developmental, and political gains that we believe an FTAA can
help generate.
These benefits will not emerge automatically, nor as an inevitable
corollary of increased trade liberalization, but instead will require a
balanced and equitable process of give and take.
60
The most recent Summit of the Americas to discuss the conclusion of
an FTAA was held in. Argentina in November 2005. At that summit,
approximately twenty-nine nations supported the conclusion of an FTAA;
however, the five opposing nations constitute the bulk of Mercosur and
control nearly half of all Latin American trade.61 The latter group inserted
language into the final agreement stating that the "conditions do not exist
to attain a hemispheric free-trade accord that is balanced and fair with
access to markets . . . free of subsidies and distorted commercial
practices."62 As a result, the talks broke down and President Bush departed
the summit before it concluded.63
The FTAA as proposed in Santiago was dead. Yet the interest of the
58. See, e.g., The WTO Doha Development Round, Aug. 1, 2006,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/wto-doha-development-round/article-157082.
59. See, e.g., Remy Jurenas, Agriculture in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Congressional
Research Service, Agricultural Policy Briefing Book, http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/
briefingbooks/Agriculture/Agriculture%2in%20the%2Free%2Trade%2Area%20of%
2 0the
%20Americas.htm (last updated June 15, 2004).
60. Press release, Rubens A. Barbosa, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Brazil
and the United States: Overcoming Obstacles to an FTAA, available at
http://www.brasilemb.org/embassy/embaixadorftaa.shtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
61. See, e.g., Garry Leech, Despite FTAA Defeat at Americas Summit, Free Trade To Be Imposed
on Colombia, COLOMBIA J. ONLINE, Nov. 7 2005, available at http://www.colombiajournal.org/
colombia221.htm.
62. See Summit of the Americas Fails To Resurrect FTAA, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.,
Nov. 9, 2005, at 5.
63. See Leech, supra note 61.
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United States in securing trade agreements in the region was not. Strong
support for some type of agreement by several Latin American countries
led the United States to pursue bilateral FTAs with willing Latin American
countries instead. The United States was never averse to the use of bilateral
FTAs in the region.64 In fact, former U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
Robert Zoellick stated at the Miami ministerial meeting, "the U.S. will not
wait [for the won't-do countries]: we will move towards free trade with
can-do countries."
65
The United States was intent on securing a trade agreement with Latin
America in some form. While the United States' efforts to secure a
multilateral FTAA have failed, the United States may still be able to
reassert its power in the hemisphere through the signing of bilateral
FTAs.66
Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, strongly supported President
Bush in his push for a regional FTA.67 However, despite his political
popularity, his position is not supported by a majority of the Colombian
population.68 Despite the lack of strong domestic support for a regional or
bilateral trade agreement with the United States, President Uribe pursued a
bilateral agreement with the United States. A final agreement was signed
on February 27, 2006.
Colombia's primary trade partner outside of South America is the
United States, the recipient of approximately 40% of all Colombian
exports 69 Accordingly, Colombia has- significant interests to protect with
regard to tariff and quota rates for Colombian exports to the United States.
-In addition, Colombia does not have a highly diversified economy,
resulting in part from its dependence on the United States as its primary
trading partner, leaving few alternative markets offering sufficient
demand. 70 However, Colombia would have only pursued a trade
64. See, e.g., Carranza, supra note 11, at 1054 (noting that at the Miami ministerial meeting,
the United States stated its intent to pursue bilateral agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, along with the FTAA itself).
65. Zoellick, supra note 8, at 23.
66. See, e.g., Carranza, supra note 11, at 1036 ("Bilateral free trade agreements... such as the
one signed with Chile on June 6, 2003, would allow the United States to obtain concessions
from individual countries without going through the cumbersome FTAA process."). The
United States may also gain politically from entering into a bilateral FTA with Columbia. See
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Remarks with Colombian Foreign Minister Barco (Apr. 27,
2005) ("[W]e spoke about the free trade agreement [with Colombia] and how important this is
in its connection to combating drugs for Colombia.").
67. See, e.g., Jane Bussey, Trade Negotiations Are Everywhere, But Can They Reach Fruition?,
FOR. POL., Jan. 1, 2005.
68. See, e.g., Leech, supra note 61 (finding that forty-three percent of Colombians are
opposed to a bilateral trade agreement with the United States while thirty-eight percent
support such an agreement).
69. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REPORT: COLOMBIA 10 (2007); see also
Agudelo et al., supra note 33, at 12; Orlando Gracia & Hernando Zuleta, The Free Trade
Agreement Between Columbia and USA: What Can Happen to Colombia? 8 (Kiel Institute for
World Economy Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.ifw-kiel.de/VRCent/
DEGIT/paper/degit-10/c010-023.pdf.
70. Agudelo et al., supra note 33, at 14.
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agreement with the United States if it could be assured of actual economic
and political gains. The United States was ready to offer these benefits,
"but only after [Latin American countries] were able to shape up their own
economies and get them on the road to recovery and steady growth." 71 As
a stable, democratic, middle-income country, Colombia is a viable
beneficiary.
III. THE BILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION
Making substantial decisions in the context of foreign affairs, such as
eliminating agricultural subsidies, invading a sovereign nation, or joining
the International Criminal Court requires vast amounts of political capital
and negotiation. International trade is an area that can be approached
either from a grandiose perspective, i.e., multilateral agreements, or from a
smaller, more direct approach, i.e., bilateral trade agreements. The latter
approach, which might be considered incrementalist,72 may be more
effective in securing short-term benefits and maintaining sufficient political
capital for a politician to remain in office. The broad, multilateral approach,
which involves negotiating through the WTO, takes substantial political
capital in the form of time-consuming and highly-technical trade
negotiations and is unlikely to show significant results in the short time
that a trade representative or politician occupies her office. The incremental
approach offers some hope of economic gain with a lower political capital
price tag and is thus the preferred approach, despite its potentially harmful
effects on long-term economic growth and stability of the world economy.
Incremental decision-making "is decision-making through small or
incremental moves on particular problems rather than through a
comprehensive reform program." 73 The authors of this approach
incorporate their model of "disjointed incrementalism" as a reflection of
both the real and ideal methods of problem-solving in the policymaking
process. Their approach to policymaking lowers the grand hopes and
expectations of policymakers and encourages them to establish realistic,
objective goals that can be accomplished despite a lack of complete
information.
The incremental approach does not see long-term gains as feasible
during the political shelf life of most politicians. Rather, it identifies
marginal gains loosely directed toward the achievement of some greater
goal as the most productive approach, despite the possibility that long-
term goals might never be achieved. 74 Recognizing that objectives, goals
and values change as policies move forward, this approach sets smaller,
more achievable short-term goals that allow for the long-term targets to
71. Hakim, Western Hemisphere, supra note 26, at 124.
72. See DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 71-77 (1963). The approach of incremental change was
presented in 1963 by David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom.
73. Id. at 71.
74. See id. at 102-03.
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remain flexible.75
Despite the drawbacks and criticisms of this theory, 76 it appears to be a
reflection of the current U.S. policymaking approach to trade agreements. 77
The United States has not abandoned its use of FTAs 78 in favor of
encouraging the growth of a multilateral trading system largely because it
is time-consuming and not cost-effective to wait for the effective
functioning of a multilateral system. Achieving consensus among 150
member states to implement such a comprehensive trading regime on
tariffs, subsidies, and other key trade areas has resulted in a slow moving
and often stalled process of multilateral negotiations. Bilateral trade
agreements and regional trade agreements function as a shortcut to the
achievement of freer trade. In addition, non-trade benefits are eligible for
concession when negotiating outside the WTO system, which would
otherwise prohibit the negotiation of issues such as labor and
environmental standards.
79
It is not only the speed of achieving consensus on a multilateral trade
regime that has caused many countries to seek FTAs outside the WTO
regime. At a recent WTO conference, Mari Elka Pangestu, Indonesia's
Minister of Trade, said that while developing country trade ministers are
well aware of the better terms of trade that they could achieve in a
multilateral trading regime, and while they know that FTAs are almost
always negative for developing countries, pressure from businesses in their
own countries force them to conclude some type of agreement that
provides at least limited benefits to their industries.80 Returning home
without some type of trade agreement may reduce industry support for the
75. Id. at 71-73.
76 See, e.g., Bernard Hennessy, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process,
17 W. POL. Q. 545 (1964) (book review) (arguing that this theory fails to add anything to the
field of political science and is perhaps more of a philosophical examination of a well-known
process).
77. A comprehensive and informed approach to trade agreements would be to abide by
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) Article XXIV, which restricts the entry
by member states into bilateral FTAs by requiring notification and sanctioning of any free
trade agreement outside the purview of the WTO. By discouraging FTAs in favor of moving
toward a multilateral trading system that is monitored and enforced by a neutral world body,
the WTO seeks to equitably balance the treatment of all member states and to protect
developing countries from being taken advantage of through inequitable FTAs. As of 2005,
the WTO received notification of nearly 300 regional trade agreements (RTAs) . Of these, only
one has been sanctioned under Article XXIV and remains active. See CONSULTATIVE BOARD,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 21-22 (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/lOanniv-e/futurewto-e.pdf. This trend indicates an unwillingness to pursue a
comprehensive and informed approach, consistent with Braybrooke and Lindblom's
assessment.
78. See The Australia-US FTA-A Step Towards Multilateral Free Trade? Analysis, AGRA
EUROPE WEEKLY, Dec. 3, 2004, at Al.
79. See CONSULTATIVE BOARD, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 77, at 23.
80. See Dr. Mar Elka Pangestu, Minister of Trade, Republic of Indonesia, WTO and the
Developing Countries: an Indonesian Perspective, Keynote Presented at WTO at 10: Dispute
Settlement, Governance and Developing Countries, Columbia University, New York (Apr. 5-
6, 2006), available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/pangestu.pdf.
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ruling party.
The result of a desire to move forward, even if only in small steps, and
the recognition that, while a better system may exist, more immediate
results are better for maintaining political capital, is a process of disjointed
incrementalism. In the context of international trade, an area to which
Braybrooke and Lindblom may not have predicted the application of their
theory, the benefits and drawbacks of an incremental approach applied
through FTAs between developed and developing countries may offer
short-term political capital to both parties, but may also result in
substantially inequitable economic conditions and thus long-term political
disaster, at least for the developing country party.
IV. THE U.S.-COLOMBIA FTA: A NECESSARY EVIL FOR COLOMBIA?
The U.S.-Colombia FTA is not uniformly negative for either party, as it
provides some economic gains to both markets. This section intends to
focus on the primary agricultural and industrial sectors with which the
agreement is concerned and to present some of the most significant
benefits for both parties that stem from these sectors. Broadly speaking, the
agreement provides increased market access for exporters and investors
from both parties. However, the extent of access is significantly more
limited for Colombian exporters, while the gains for the United States are
consistently larger in both quantity and quality of access. This section will
discuss these gains and losses in more detail.
A. Primary Gains to the Colombian Economy
The gains to Colombia from the bilateral agreement with the United
States should be viewed in the context of the expiring ATPA, which
provided similar benefits on a term basis. The ATPA provided Colombia
with duty-free access for the vast majority of Colombian goods coming into
the United States.81 The ATPA benefits were set to expire at the end of
2006. Under the newly negotiated bilateral agreement, most of these trade
preferences are made permanent. The primary exception to the agreement
is the export of Colombian sugar, which will still face tariffs and quota
restrictions in the United States. "Any exports [of sugar] beyond the [Tariff
Rate Quotas] TRQ would face prohibitively high tariffs."82 Thus, while
many of the trade preferences previously granted under the ATPA will
continue under the new agreement, sugar exports are still limited.
Colombia will open its previously closed market to the import of U.S.
81. Fact Sheet, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade with
Colombia: Summary of the Agreement (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/DocumentLibrary/Fact-Sheets/2006/asset upload file485_9023.pdf [hereinafter Fact
Sheet, USTRI.
82. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Announces Completion of Free-Trade
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remanufactured goods, including machinery, computers, and cellular
phones.83 Colombia will also provide immediate duty-free treatment to
U.S. farm exports, including beef, pork, corn, poultry, rice, fruits,
vegetables, processed foods, and dairy products.84 Further, Colombia will
provide immediate duty-free treatment to U.S. textiles, presuming that
they meet the rules of origin under the agreement, although an escape
clause was added to protect Colombian producers in the event that
domestic Colombian producers are harmed by excessive imports. 85 This
increased flow of U.S. goods into Colombia will likely have the effect of
reducing prices to consumers on food, clothing, and technology; 86 however,
the increased competition from foreign manufacturers is also likely to have
a negative effect on domestic industries in Colombia.
In the services sector, Colombia plans to offer more opportunities for
market access to the U.S. service industry by dismantling investment
barriers and removing the requirement that a subsidiary corporate branch
be established in Colombia before services are provided. 87 These benefits
particularly favor the U.S. construction, energy, and professional services
industries, but also pave the way for new foreign direct investment
opportunities in Colombia.88 In addition, telecommunication markets in
Colombia will be opened by removing the ability of local firms to claim
"first right" of access to telecom networks, 89 again increasing competition
and likely lowering prices for telecom services to Colombian consumers.
U.S. investors in Colombia will have an opportunity to operate in a
more stable legal framework under the agreement. All types of investments
are protected under the agreement, including enterprise, debt, concessions,
and intellectual property.90 For the most part, U.S. investors will be treated
as if they were Colombian investors, with the ability to establish; acquire,
and operate investments throughout the country. 91 They will also be
provided with due process protections and remedies in the event of legal
claims such as expropriation by the state. 92 These provisions may instill a
greater sense of security for foreign investors and thus promote investment
in Colombia.
93
83. Fact Sheet, USTR, supra note 81, at 1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2.
86. See, e.g., Krysta Boryskavich & Aaron Bowler, Trade and Culture: Hollywood North: Tax
Incentives and the Film Industry in Canada, 2 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 25, 28 n.6 (2002)
(noting the Canadian Department of Finance expected NAFTA to improve Canadian citizen
welfare by reducing consumer and factor prices).
87. Fact Sheet, USTR, supra note 81, at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa
Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 90, 103-04 (1976), cited in
Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29
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For intellectual property protections, U.S. companies will be treated
equally with Colombian companies. Colombia agreed to develop an online
trademark registration system to extend the terms of copyright protections,
to limit the grounds for revoking a patent, and to create a system for
preventing the marketing of pharmaceutical products that infringe
patents.94 The Colombian government is also required to use only
legitimate computer software and to criminalize end-user piracy (such as
illegal music downloading).95
Additionally, the agreement requires that Colombia post laws and
regulations on the Internet, providing procedural certainty and
transparency to foreign investors. The agreement also calls for laws that
prohibit anti-competitive business conduct, enforce domestic labor and
environmental laws, and establish dispute settlement panels that promote
compliance through "consultation and trade-enhancing remedies."
96
Finally, the agreement includes "innovative provisions that allow the
creation of working groups to evaluate the impacts of the agreement on
small and medium-sized businesses."
97
B. Primary Losses to the Colombian Economy
1. Agriculture
One of the primary Latin American objections to the FTAA was the.
refusal of the United States to negotiate its position on agricultural
subsidies. The importance of this issue to the region cannot be overstated;
however, the importance of this issue to each individual country in Latin
America resonates unequally. 98 For Colombia, progress on reducing
foreign agricultural barriers is highly important. The U.S.-Colombia FTA
did not address U.S. agricultural subsidies, nor does the United States seem
likely to address them in other bilateral FTAs.99
The agreement is highly favorable to certain U.S. agricultural
industries, especially the beef, cotton, and wheat industries. These
agricultural sectors will largely receive immediate duty-free access to the
PEPP. L. REV. 43, 52 (2001) (discussing the need to include provisions that give investors a
forum to raise disputes within trade agreements).
94. Fact Sheet, USTR, supra note 81, at 4.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. For example, the Colombian agricultural sector is 12.3% of its economy, whereas in
Brazil agriculture accounts for 8% of its total economy, and in Venezuela it accounts for 4% of
the total economy. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY COMMERCE REPORT: BRAZIL 6
(2006); ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY COMMERCE REPORT: COLOMBIA 6 (2007);
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY COMMERCE REPORT: VENEZUELA 6 (2006).
99. See, e.g., Jenalia Moreno, FTAA Trade Meeting: U.S. Adds 6 Players to Lean on Brazil: S.
American Giant Puts Up Resistance, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2003, at 1B, 10B (suggesting that
the U.S. refusal to address subsidies in the FTAA context signals an unwillingness to negotiate
in the bilateral context as well).
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Colombian market.100 According to negotiators, agricultural issues were
the reason for the delayed conclusion of an agreement. 10' Strong opposition
from most sectors of the Colombian agriculture industry was unsuccessful
in slowing or preventing the progress of the agreement.
1°2
Rice, poultry, 1°3 and sugar'0 are three of the most sensitive agricultural
products to the Colombian economy. Colombian negotiators sought to
receive expanded duty-free access to the U.S. market for sugar in the range
of 500,000 to one million additional tons per year. U.S. negotiators sought
to protect the interests of the U.S. domestic sugar industry, which argued
that Colombian access to the U.S. sugar market would triple in the first
year, negatively impacting the U.S. sugar industry.1 5 The resulting
agreement provided additional access to only 50,000 tons of Colombian
sugar (for a total of 75,000 tons per year). 1°6 The quota on sugar will
increase by 750 tons per year; however, the over-quota tariff is the only
tariff in the FTA that will never be phased out.
1°7
The United States was interested in expanding access for domestic
producers to the Colombian rice market, which had previously been highly
restrictive. The result was an increased quota of 79,000 tons and tariff
elimination phased in over nineteen years."l 8 This was a significant
improvement over past treatment and was hailed by the U.S. rice industry
as a success over Colombian opposition09°
Colombia agreed to open its market to U.S. exports of chicken leg
quarters, despite strong opposition by Colombian poultry farmers.1 0 The
market will permit an initial quota of 26,000 tons to be imported, with a
duty of about 70% on imports above that level."' A representative from a
Colombian poultry trade association argued that this provision could wipe
out the Colombian poultry industry "in a couple of years.""
2
Fair trade advocates have identified agriculture as one of the most
significant drawbacks to this agreement for Colombia, finding that the risk
of U.S. dumping (flooding the target market with goods sold at below
market value, in many cases driving local producers out of business) and
100. See Fact Sheet, USTR, supra note 81, at 1.
101. US, Colombia Sign Bilateral FTA, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Mar. 1, 2006, at 6.
102. Id. (noting, however, that the Colombian flower industry is expected to benefit from
this FTA).
103. See US, Colombia Sign Bilateral FTA, supra note 101, at 6.
104. Completed Colombia FTA Would Triple Sugar Access in the First Year, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,





109. Forrest Laws, Colombia Trade Agreement Could Help Sell More U.S. Rice, DELTA FARM
PRESS, Mar. 17, 2006, http://deltafarmpress.com/mag/farming-colombia-trade-agreement/
index.html (discussing the comments of the USA Rice Federation toward the newly concluded
agreement).
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the removal of safeguards that offer food security could be highly
detrimental to the Colombian market.11 3 According to the author of a recent
Oxfam report on the agreement, "[t]rade could be the engine to pull
millions out of poverty, but instead the winners of this agreement are
American and international companies."
114
2. Dispute Settlement
A mechanism for exporters to remedy certain trade disputes between
countries is an invaluable facet of an effective trade agreement.15 The U.S.-
Colombia FTA includes investment dispute provisions that provide for
binding international arbitration should a dispute arise.11 6 With regard to
conflicts between the states over the agreement itself, a dispute settlement
mechanism exists that allows for monetary remedies to force compliance
with respect to the core obligations of the agreement.
1 7
Article XXIV of the GATT agreement discourages member states from
entering into bilateral FTAs. One of the rationales for this article is that
weak states will receive legal protection from more economically and
politically powerful states if they manage their trade solely through the
multilateral mechanism.1 18 Article XXIV urges the use of a multilateral
approach at the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, which allows
weaker countries to effect more equitable and enforceable settlements. 1 9
Without protections against power imbalances, weaker parties to a bilateral
trade agreement may find it more difficult to employ dispute settlement
mechanisms for fear of economic or political retaliation, which the WTO
may be unable to prevent if not conducted in the multilateral trade
environment.
In the case of the U.S.-Colombia FTA, the dispute settlement
mechanism has not yet been implemented; however, as it will operate
outside the multilateral environment, Colombia faces a greater likelihood
of political and economic pressure to challenge only the most egregious
113. Oxfam, Oxfam Warns US-Andean Trade Deals Will Harm Developing Countries,
(June 14, 2006), http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/prO60614-song__sirens.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Hakim, Western Hemisphere, supra note 26, at 132 (suggesting that a dispute
settlement system would be an important benefit to a Latin American country entering a trade
agreement with the United States).
116. See Fact Sheet, USTR, supra note 81, at 3.
117. See id. at 7 (noting availability of such mechanisms in the U.S.-Chilean agreement).
118. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE BOARD, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 77, 53
("For as long as [powerful states] choose to exert that market power in a multilateral context,
under rules agreed by everyone, the poor and the weak need not fear a return to the law of the
jungle.").
119. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General, Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Agreements:
Friends or Foes?, 2006 Gabriel Silver Memorial Lecture at Columbia University 9 (Oct. 31,
2006), available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/news-events/special-events/silver_
lecture/LamySIPASilverLecture.pdf (arguing that bilateral agreement dispute settlement
provisions "cannot replace" those in the multilateral context, largely because they cannot
resolve power imbalances as the WTO is able to do).
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agreement violations. Had the agreement been negotiated in the
multilateral context, that is, at the WTO, Colombia would be less likely to
face potential retaliation or loss of benefits were it to challenge U.S. trade
practices.
120
3. Weak Overall Economic Gains
Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-
based policy organization addressing hemispheric issues, argues that the
benefits of free trade for Latin America depend on three factors, each of
which varies based on the country: 1) the amount of exports shipped to the
United States; 2) the level of import barriers in the United States faced by
the particular country, and; 3) the contribution of exports to the country's
economy. 121
In 2005, Colombian exports totaled $21.1 billion, or 17.1% of annual
GDP; exports to the United States accounted for 43% of total exports, and
imports from the United States accounted for 29% of total imports.122 As a
result of an FTA with the United States, Colombia's exports to the United
States are expected to increase by roughly 4%, or $600 million.123 The
resulting increase, while significant, is far less than the economic gains
realized by more export-oriented economies like the "Asian tigers,"
1 24
which, as of 1993, exported close to 40% of their total GDP.
125
4. Effects on the Informal Economy
Losses to an economy from a bilateral trade agreement may reach
beyond the formal economy of consumers and licensed producers. The
informal economy, which consists of those manufacturers and sellers that
operate outside the bounds of the legal marketplace, either via home
production, street vending, or informal markets, comprise a substantial
portion, if not a majority, of the economic contingent of production in
120. See id.
121. Hakim, Western Hemisphere, supra note 26, at 126-28.
122. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note:
Colombia (Oct. 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm.
123. See, e.g., U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Enhanced Market Access to
Colombia, Export.gov, http://www.export.gov/fta/colombia/mrktaccss.asp?dName=
Colombia (last visited Mar. 14, 2007) (outlining the benefits of U.S. exporters to Colombia); see
Beneficios de la Negociaci6n de un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos,
TLC.gov, http://www.tlc.gov.co/eContent/library/documents/DocNewsNo3804Document
No1159.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2007) (outlining the benefits of Colombian exports to the
United States and Colombian domestic industries).
124. The "Asian tigers", a group of seven countries consisting of India, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Japan, stood out as models of rapid economic
development prior to their 1997 regional financial crises. See, e.g., The downward spiral of the
Asian tigers, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/specialreport/1998/
asianeconomic crises/72222.stm.
125. Hakim, Western Hemisphere, supra note 26, at 128.
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developing countries. Informal businesses exist in the United States, but on
a comparatively small scale.126 In many developing countries, these
informal economies constitute 60% or more of the total economy.127 The
World Bank estimates that Colombia's informal economy is 39.1% of its
total GDP.128
This Section will address two potential concerns over the impact of a
bilateral trade agreement on this critically important sector: 1) the likely
increase in informal employment resulting from formal job losses, and; 2)
the limited ability of informal businesses to participate in the global
markets created by a bilateral trade agreement.
After the conclusion of the NAFTA agreement between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada, Mexico encountered substantial economic
problems. These included a reduction in manufacturing sector
employment, a 10% average drop in industrial worker wages, and a
growth spurt in the informal economy. 129 During the 1990s, a similar
expansion of income inequality was seen in Colombia, largely due to an
imbalance across economic sectors and an increase in wage premiums. 130
This growth in informality means a larger portion of the population is
without access to government benefits, such as social security or
unemployment insurance, placing more people at risk of falling into
poverty.
With respect to the ability to participate in new market opportunities
created by the trade agreement, informal businesses are at a significant
disadvantage. Moving from the informal to the formal sector by registering
a business and acquiring necessary licenses to operate is much faster and
less expensive in the United States than in Colombia. To begin a formal
business, the World Bank estimates that it would take about five days, with
an average of five steps and would cost 0.5% of annual GDP per capita in
the United States,131 as compared to twelve steps, taking roughly forty-
three days and costing 25.3% of annual GDP per capita in Colombia. In
addition, acquiring the licenses to operate and complying with permit
requirements for a U.S. manufacturer would take about seventy days and
cost 16.9% of GDP per capita. The same business in Colombia would
require 150 days and cost 697.3% of GDP per capita to comply. 32 Finally,
the time it takes to export goods once the business has been legally
registered and licensed is nine days in the United States and thirty-four in
126. The World Bank estimates the U.S. informal economic sector to be 8.8%. WORLD
BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004, 175 (2003).
127. See Friedrich Schneider, Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries
Around the World 10 (World Bank Working Paper, 2002) available at http://rru.worldbank.org/
Documents/PapersLinks/informal economy.pdf (estimating that Bolivia encompasses the
largest informal economy at 68% of total GDP).
128. WORLD BANK, supra note 126, at 142.
129. GUY POITRAS, INVENTING NORTH AMERICA: CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED
STATES 125 (2001).
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Colombia. 133 Thus, while a U.S. seller may survive the wait and could
potentially benefit from the agreement, a typical informal Colombian
business operator that wanted to export their goods would likely face
significant challenges in getting their goods to foreign markets and thus
would be less likely to benefit from the agreement.
The distinction between the benefits accruing to an informal 'economic
businessperson who moves into the formal economy in the United States
and that same businessperson in Colombia are stark. Yet more importantly,
the scope of this impact is much greater in Colombia, where more than one
third of their economy operates informally"4 and is unable to benefit easily
and affordably from the trade agreement. Accordingly, potential losses to
the Colombian economy from the lessened ability of a major portion of its
population to participate in the trade agreement must be assessed.
Inequitable trade results when economic benefits from trade accrue to
one segment of society and either have no effect or a negative effect on
other segments of society. When a segment of society is excluded from the
export economy due to an inability to operate their business legally, any
export-driven benefits acquired through an FTA will accrue
disproportionately. The reason for this disproportionate distribution is that
when a large informal sector persists, that sector is unlikely to contain
direct participants in the export economy. Thus, as anticipated economic
benefits begin to accrue domestically, they will accrue primarily with the
direct participants -the formal economic actors. This has been the trend in
other trade agreements in the Americas. 35 Accordingly, the income gap
among the Colombian population may widen because of this FTA as a
result of increased export benefits for Colombia's legal exporters combined
with the negative impact of increased competition from U.S. imports on
extralegal businesses throughout Colombia. This very concern was raised
in a recent United Nations report, which found that as trade liberalization
has expanded around the world, so has the incidence of employment in the
informal sector. 36
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Are FTAs Negative for Economic Development?
The effect of -an FTA on Colombian economic growth is uncertain.
According to an economic study conducted by Hernando Zuleta and Oscar
133. Id.
134. WORLD BANK, supra note 126, at 142.
135. See, e.g., Gerardo Esquivel & Jose Antonio Rodriguez-Lopez, Technology, Trade, and
Wage Inequality in Mexico Before and After NAFTA, 72 J. DEv. ECON. 543, 548-51 (2003)
(discussing the effects of NAFTA on wage inequality in Mexico and finding that the wage gap
between skilled and non-skilled workers increased both before and after the implementation
of NAFTA, largely due to technological change).
136. See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Inequality Predicament: Report on the World
Social Situation 2005, 36-38, U.N. Doc. A/60/117/Rev.1/ST/ESA/299 (2005).
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Gracia, "the effect of FTA [on the Colombian economy] alone is likely to be
relatively small." 137 By and large, developing countries are importers of
goods; accordingly, an FTA that lowers import barriers will generally-
provide greater benefits to the country that exports more as their goods
will be granted easier entry. 138 The impact of a bilateral trade agreement on
Colombia may be less significant than FTAs in other parts of the world
where a stronger export economy is already in place.
139
As a growing middle-income economy, Colombia is approaching the
road to economic independence and should tread carefully to avoid
succumbing to a deeper dependency relationship with the United States.
Trade offers many developing countries opportunities to pursue economic
growth strategies. However, it is not in the opening of markets that these
opportunities lie. Rather, trade offers an opportunity to examine domestic
policies on imports and exports, manufacturing, technological growth, as
well as to evaluate rule of law protections for domestic producers and
foreign investors, regulatory flexibility for licensing and innovation, and
investment in domestic education and health programs.
140
The short-term gain policy approach to trade agreements applied by
the United States may serve short-term interests and appease certain
business communities in both the United States and the partner country.
However, this incremental approach suffers from a lack of foresight and
ignores a deeper discussion about development and equitable trade,
without which the global trading system will be less predictable,
accountable, and successful. In the case under examination here, Colombia
may experience the shortfalls of this approach, enduring short-term
benefits in the form of lower consumer prices on certain goods while
succumbing to long-term job losses and industry failures as a result of
increased and more efficient competition. In terms of Colombia's economic
development, a framework for sustainable growth and poverty reduction
requires looking beyond the limited short-term gains of a bilateral trade
agreement.
Using this incremental approach to secure an FTA with Colombia may
blind policymakers to the most salient trade issues in the region -namely,
equitable economic growth policy, development assistance, and growth of
social capital. The imbalanced trade resulting from this and similar FTAs
further solidifies the inferior position of developing countries in the global
marketplace.
137. Gracia & Zuleta, supra note 69.
138. Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework
on Investment at the VTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 95, 96-
99 (2005).
139. See Agduelo, supra note 33, at 21 (inferring that globalization and trade agreements in
general have less impact in Latin America than they do in other parts of the world).
140. See, e.g., Hakim, Western Hemisphere, supra note 26, at 121 (suggesting that the
economic and political restructuring resulting from free trade agreements is where the real
economic benefits are derived).
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B. The Alternative Approach
Colombia and other South American countries have an alternative to
forming either an FTAA or entering potentially detrimental bilateral
agreements with the United States. One of these options is to focus on
South-South trade by increasing ties with countries such as China and
India. This is already a growing option with regard to China, as seen by the
recent exchanges between Hu Jintao, President of China, and several Latin
American countries. 141 Another perhaps more powerful alternative would
involve a unification of Mercosur with the Andean Community, which
would create a significant force in the Western hemisphere and in the
world, and might serve as an adequate substitute for the conclusion of an
FTAA.42 A regional approach to liberalized Latin American trade has the
advantage of unifying related markets, each of which shares the goals of
poverty reduction and equitable economic growth. Recent events in the
region, such as Venezuela's withdrawal from the Andean Community,
may make such regional unification difficult from a political standpoint,
but it is in the best economic interests of each country to pursue a single
approach to foreign trade for the region, as evidenced by the strong trading
positions taken on by the European Union and ASEAN.
One frequent objection to complete South American integration is that
while some countries (Colombia, Peru) seek stronger ties with their
Northern neighbors, other countries (Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia) are more
interested in loosening these ties. Peter Hakim recently argued in Foreign
Affairs that the United States is losing its influence in the region, largely
because of the econorfhic failures that have been blamed on the
implementation of U.S.-backed neoliberal policies. 143 Yet this shift away
from U.S. partnerships should not divide the otherwise culturally and
economically intertwined countries of South America from each other.
Regional integration and unified external policy can strengthen the
position of Latin America in the global marketplace, allowing it to acquire
better concessions in future trade agreements and to negotiate more
forcefully in the multilateral context. In addition, with the recent change of
power in the U.S. Congress, trade deals between the United States and
Colombia and Peru may be stalled, perhaps indefinitely, as Democrats
reevaluate their desire to offer new concessions to trading partners.144 This
could not only mean a reduction in already low U.S. regional participation,
but also an opportunity for the previously Northern-facing countries to
141. See Peter Hakim, Is Washington Losing Latin America?, FOREIGN AFE., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at
39, 45 (finding that "some members of Congress view China as the most serious challenge to
U.S. interests in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union" and observing that "the
huge financial resources China is promising to bring to Latin America, its growing military-to-
military relations in the region, and its clear political ambitions" may be "potential threats to
the long-standing pillar of U.S. policy in the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine").
142. See Carranza, supra note 11, at 1052.
143. See Hakim, Is Washington Losing, supra note 141.
144. See Snubs and Opportunities, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 37, 37-38.
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reevaluate the potential gains from integration with their neighbors.
What this Article has attempted to show is that bilateral free trade
agreements are risky for the less powerful party both because they detract
from more equitable multilateral negotiations at the WTO, and because
they often extract more economically detrimental concessions from the
weaker party in the negotiations at the expense of long-term economic
development goals. Yet these agreements are a growing reality today and
may be indicative of gaps in the multilateral negotiating process.
145
Accordingly, developing countries must be urged to proceed with caution,
rather than desperation. Small gains in the short-term can serve the
interests of some developing country constituents, but at what cost to long-
term economic development? Utilizing the power of a regional
organization, such as Mercosur, is one alternative to going it alone. Yet it is
imperative that policymakers in developing countries recognize their
negotiating position, identify their long-term strategy for economic
development, and proceed with the mission of providing a sustainable
future for their children rather than simply pursuing short-term political
gains.
145. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE BOARD, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 118, at 19-
26 (noting that proponents of preferential trade agreements argue that they offer benefits over
the multilateral system including broader and deeper trade reforms, political motivations, and
non-reciprocal benefits, among others).
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